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NOTE
University Regulation of Student Speech:
In Search of a Unified Mode of Analysis
Patrick Miller*
Universities are meant to be open marketplaces of ideas. This requires a com-
mitment to both freedom of expression and inclusivity, two values that may
conflict. When public universities seek to promote inclusivity by prohibiting or
punishing speech that is protected by the First Amendment, courts must inter-
vene to vindicate students’ rights. Currently, courts are split over the appropri-
ate mode of analysis for reviewing public university regulation of student
speech. This Note seeks to aid judicial review by clarifying the three existing
approaches—public forum analysis, traditional categorical analysis, and a
modified version of the Supreme Court’s education-specific speech doctrine—
and proposes a more precise version of education-specific analysis. This Note
proposes that when student speech may not be reasonably attributed to the
school, any attempt by the university to regulate the content of student speech
must be narrowly tailored to target only exclusionary speech and to protect
core moral and political speech.
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Introduction
The year 2017 was a trying time for universities as increasingly hateful
demonstrations spread across the country. In an effort to maintain a wel-
coming and inclusive environment on their campuses, many public universi-
ties and colleges employ restrictions on offensive speech.1 These restrictions
include university speech codes and accompanying disciplinary actions. The
chilling effects of such policies can have a profound effect on student speech,
and many courts have invalidated campus speech codes under the First
Amendment.2 Yet universities continue to develop, modify, and enforce such
policies in order to remove speech deemed offensive from campus
discourse.3
Judicial review of university regulation of offensive student speech is
particularly complicated because of the varying modes of First Amendment
analysis used by courts. While some courts have adopted a public forum
analysis, others use only traditional categorical analysis, and still others use
an education-specific approach. Recent scholarship has also highlighted a
divergence in opinions about the constitutional boundaries of student
speech regulation. While some scholars argue that universities may legally
regulate a good deal of speech,4 others contend that the power of universities
to regulate student speech is quite constrained,5 and still others are unable to
come to a conclusion on what the law is with regard to harassing speech.6
This Note argues that many university policies regarding offensive and
harassing speech unconstitutionally infringe on student speech7 and thus re-
quire careful judicial scrutiny. Such scrutiny is difficult, however, because of
the conflict between the competing modes of analysis. In order to simplify
and encourage searching judicial review of university speech policies, this
Note argues that the Third Circuit’s approach—which adapts the Supreme
Court’s education-specific speech cases8 to the university setting—should be
1. While the freedom of speech is certainly important at private schools, they do not
face the same First Amendment restraints, and thus this Note deals only with public universi-
ties and colleges.
2. See infra Part I.
3. See id.
4. See Alexander Tsesis, Campus Speech and Harassment, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 1863, 1899
(2017).
5. Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101 Minn. L.
Rev. 1801, 1817–18 (2017).
6. Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, A Close-up, Modern Look at First Amend-
ment Academic Freedom Rights of Public College Students and Faculty, 101 Minn. L. Rev. 1943,
1963–70 (2017).
7. Speech by public university professors and officials may also be protected by the First
Amendment, but as public employees, the First Amendment analysis is significantly different
from the analysis of restrictions on student speech and is beyond the scope of this Note. See
generally id. at 1970–84.
8. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
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adopted and modified to better reflect First Amendment values and provide
clear guidance to judges, university administrators, and students. When
courts are reviewing university regulation of student speech, the university
action should be invalidated unless it is narrowly tailored to prohibit only
exclusionary speech and to protect core moral and political speech. In prac-
tice, this means that in order to punish a student for speech, the school
would need to show that the speech created a hostile environment or sub-
stantially deprived the target of the speech of access to opportunities and
that it was not an expression of moral or political conviction.9
Part I examines the current treatment of harassing and offensive speech
on university campuses and concludes that judicial review is necessary be-
cause many universities are unconstitutionally restrictive in dealing with of-
fensive speech. Part II evaluates the primary modes of analysis used by
courts in evaluating university regulation of offensive student speech. Part
III argues that the Third Circuit’s approach best protects the First Amend-
ment rights of students and suggests modifications to that approach to bet-
ter protect speech.
I. Harassing Speech and the University
Speech is given a “transcendent value” in American society,10 and the
“vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools.”11 When speech rights are in tension
with nonconstitutional interests, the First Amendment gives precedence to
speech.12 In part, this precedence stems from the recognition that speech
rights respect individual autonomy, promote the robust debate a democracy
requires, and foster a tolerant society.13 Many of the ideas that Americans
take for granted today were once considered dangerous and subversive and
were targeted for censorship.14 The vigorous search for truth requires that all
views, especially unpopular views, get a fair hearing.15 But to say that speech
9. “[M]oral and political discourse” is the “the lifeblood of constitutional self govern-
ment (and democratic education) and the core concern of the First Amendment.” Saxe v. State
Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.); see also infra Part III.
10. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
11. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
12. Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Ef-
fect”, 58 B.U. L. Rev. 685, 701–05 (1978).
13. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 Duke
L.J. 484, 535.
14. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435–36 (1963) (“We cannot close our eyes
to the fact that the militant Negro civil rights movement has engendered the intense resent-
ment and opposition of the politically dominant white community of Virginia; litigation as-
sisted by the NAACP has been bitterly fought. In such circumstances, a statute broadly
curtailing group activity leading to litigation may easily become a weapon of oppression, how-
ever evenhanded its terms appear. Its mere existence could well freeze out of existence all such
activity on behalf of the civil rights of Negro citizens.” (footnotes omitted)).
15. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (“[A] function of free speech under our
system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
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holds a revered place in American society is not to minimize the harm that
may come from allowing some speech that is highly offensive to go unpun-
ished. Defending the right of extremist groups to propagate hateful views
will subject some vulnerable groups to offensive speech.16 Sexist or racist
speech may be used to perpetuate the marginalization of some groups.17 The
robust protection of speech inevitably shelters many wrong-headed and
hurtful ideas under the umbrella of the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, our constitutional order has elevated free speech to the
status of a “transcendent value”18 that requires “breathing space.”19 Further-
more, censorship is unlikely to solve the problems of hurtful speech. Some
scholars argue that “censored speech becomes more appealing and persua-
sive to many listeners merely by virtue of the censorship.”20 When hateful
speakers face censorship, they may become martyrs and icons to extremist
groups, rather than objects of derision.21 Additionally, censorship is often
used against marginalized groups, rather than to protect them.22
Instead of resorting to censorship, universities should consider every in-
stance of hateful and harmful speech an opportunity to espouse the values of
diversity, equity, and inclusion. The University of Michigan recently exper-
ienced a rash of anonymous hateful comments written around campus.23
The resulting outpouring of support for minority students from the admin-
istration, various student organizations, and the student body at large has
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.”).
16. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2331–35 (1989).
17. Id.
18. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
19. Button, 371 U.S. at 433.
20. Strossen, supra note 13, at 554 (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 559. Looking at the current American political climate, it is not hard to believe
that censorship and disinvitations increase the popularity of repugnant figures like Milo Yian-
nopoulos. See Leigh Alexander, Milo Yiannopoulos: Twitter Banning One Man Won’t Undo His
Poisonous Legacy, Guardian (July 20, 2016, 2:11 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technolo
gy/2016/jul/20/milo-yiannopoulos-twitter-ban-leslie-jones-bad-idea [https://perma.cc/K3WG-
FQF9]; Erin Gloria Ryan, Right-Wing ‘Free Speech’ Weeks Are Just Free Publicity for Milo Yian-
nopoulos, Daily Beast (Sept. 24, 2017, 12:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/right-wing-
free-speech-weeks-are-just-free-publicity-for-milo-yiannopoulos [https://perma.cc/7A7P-
J6FM]; Jack Smith IV, By Banning Milo Yiannopoulos, Twitter Just Created a Martyr for White
Nationalism, Mic (July 20, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/149305/milo-yiannopoulos-twitter-
ban-martyr-for-white-nationalism [https://perma.cc/YE75-XPK5].
22. Strossen, supra note 13, at 556.
23. These incidents ranged from racist remarks on various sites around campus to slurs
written on doors in residence halls. The administration has not been able to identify those
responsible for the various messages. Andrew Hiyama, Battle Lines: Unresolved Responses to
Racist Incidents Online, Mich. Daily (Sept. 24, 2017, 7:12 PM), https://www.michigandaily.
com/section/administration/what-do-white-supremacy-battles-and-offline [https://perma.cc/
R6LN-G6AP].
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dwarfed the initial slurs and demonstrated the inclusive and welcoming na-
ture of the university.24 This is not to say that hateful comments should be
encouraged because they can potentially produce a greater net balance of
positive speech but that the energy of administrators is better spent on
counterspeech than searching out and punishing the perpetrators.25
Doubtless, many university administrators are stalwart defenders of the
First Amendment and the freedom of speech.26 But modern universities are
complex entities serving diverse groups of stakeholders with various com-
peting interests. Consider, for example, the broad array of university func-
tions identified by R. George Wright:
[L]earning and research; anti-discrimination; providing educational op-
portunities and making societal contributions; advancement of knowledge;
freedom of expression and communication; promoting economic growth;
disinterested scholarship; serving as societal critic; moral cultivation of the
students; professional training; preparation for competent democratic citi-
zenship; reflecting or determining status and opportunity hierarchies or
promoting social mobility; and fundamental personal transformation.27
Even a cursory glance at this list reveals competing objectives. Any attempts
at moral cultivation, teaching professionalism, or combatting discrimination
will require some type of response to offensive and inappropriate expression
and communication. Yet preparing students for the realities of professional
life and responsible citizenship requires equipping them to handle uncom-
fortable and controversial ideas.28 This does not mean that American society
should be characterized by pervasive offensive or hateful rhetoric, only that
24. Colin Beresford, Students, Community Members Gather at University Rock to Paint
over Racist Messages, Mich. Daily (Sept. 4, 2017, 2:11 PM), https://www.michigandaily.com/
section/campus-life/students-community-members-gather-university-rock-paint-over-racist-
messages [https://perma.cc/9A63-73VT]; Colin Beresford, Student Kneels in the Diag for 24
Hour Protest of Anti-Black Racism, Mich. Daily (Sept. 25, 2017, 1:20 PM), https://
www.michigandaily.com/section/campus-life/student-kneels-m-diag-joining-take-knee-pro
test [https://perma.cc/AVL4-47BQ].
25. Administrators condemning (but not punishing) hurtful speech is especially desira-
ble in circumstances where it can both support the targeted student(s) and educate the offend-
ing student (e.g. about the requirements of professionalism in the workplace). In other
circumstances, calling attention to the speech may only serve to encourage the offenders and
give the speech further publicity (such as in the case of anonymous posters or chalk messages).
26. E.g., Beth McMurtrie, With a Strong Stance on Safe Spaces, U. of Chicago Sends a
Mixed Message to Students, Chron. Higher Educ. (Aug. 26, 2016), http://www.chronicle.
com/article/With-a-Strong-Stance-on-Safe/237601 [https://perma.cc/A6L8-B64Q].
27. R. George Wright, Campus Speech and the Functions of the University, 43 J.C. & U.L.
1, 10–11 (2017) (footnotes omitted). Professor Wright compiled this list of functions from the
statements of several prominent university presidents and historical figures. Id.
28. Greg Lukianoff & Jonathan Haidt, The Coddling of the American Mind, Atlantic
(Sept. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-
american-mind/399356/ [https://perma.cc/58SS-RXZZ] (arguing that by utilizing the tech-
niques developed by cognitive behavioral therapy, students can increase their resilience and
mental health). This is not to suggest that all students are equally subjected to insults and
indignities on campus. Certainly some groups are more vulnerable and more often targeted by
hate speech. Lukianoff and Haidt do not minimize the harmfulness of hateful speech, rather
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some measure of offensive speech is inevitable, and universities are well
positioned to help students develop resilience by teaching them healthy ways
to cope with hateful and offensive speech.29
Caught between the desire to promote free expression and the desire to
foster an inclusive and welcoming environment, university administrators
may miscalculate and unconstitutionally regulate offensive student speech.30
Mistakes are understandable—the law on campus speech regulation is
fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty31—but the nature of the disciplinary
process in universities makes overregulating speech costly. In the realm of
the First Amendment, clarity is key, and mistakes may chill future
expression.
A chilling effect on speech can be traced to uncertainty.32 When stu-
dents are confused about what the First Amendment protects, they may re-
frain from making comments that are actually protected for fear that they
are not.33 Even when students have a clear understanding of their rights, if
they doubt the ability of enforcement proceedings to accurately sort pro-
tected from unprotected expression, they may refrain from voicing contro-
versial ideas.34 And even when checks in the enforcement process correctly
exonerate a student whose speech was protected, the investigation and adju-
dication proceedings themselves may chill future speech—students may fear
incurring the social and financial costs of potential disciplinary
proceedings.35
University speech codes do not alleviate these problems because they are
often ambiguous, and even those that are reasonably clear typically achieve
they argue that teaching students to respond to speech in a healthy way more effectively pro-
tects students’ mental health than trying to put an end to hateful speech. Id.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, No, It’s Not Constitutional for the University of Oklahoma to
Expel Students for Racist Speech [UPDATED in Light of the Students’ Expulsion], Wash. Post:
Volokh Conspiracy (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir-
acy/wp/2015/03/10no–a–public-university-may-not-expel-students-for-racist-speech [https://
perma.cc/7UC3-YQV7]; Papandrea, supra note 5, at 1804–06 (citing numerous recent exam-
ples of universities punishing students for offensive expression the author argues ought to have
been protected).
31. See infra Part II.
32. When scholars refer to speech being “chilled,” they are referring to the tendency of
speakers to abstain from socially valuable, First Amendment protected speech, not unprotected
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that clarity by prohibiting far more speech than is constitutionally permissi-
ble.36 While courts have invalidated many of the challenged speech codes,37
the doctrine of standing38 applied in some circuits prevents pre-enforcement
challenges, allowing the codes to continue chilling speech until a student is
disciplined and brings suit.39 Consequently, campus speech codes continue
to proliferate and often contain unconstitutional restrictions.40
Campus disciplinary proceedings are also fraught with uncertainties.
Traditional First Amendment categories of unprotected speech have typically
been built on the assumption that courts play a central role in this determi-
nation. Restrictions on speech were primarily enforced through either civil
lawsuits (for example, defamation)41 or criminal charges (for example, fight-
ing words or obscenity).42 In both cases, the courts are well positioned to
protect the First Amendment rights of the accused, and the doctrine evolved
around the realities of enforcement through some form of litigation.43
The educational setting is quite different,44 and even within that broad
category there are significant differences between K-12 institutions and insti-
tutions of higher education.45 The primary mechanism of enforcement on
campuses is not criminal or civil law but rather internal school or university
processes, which have less stringent due process protections.46 Indeed, many
36. Azhar Majeed, Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence, and Prevalence of Cam-
pus Speech Codes, 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 481, 484–85, 494–96 (2009) (citing examples of
infirm codes, such as an Ohio State University housing policy prohibiting “joke[s] about dif-
ferences related to race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, ability, socioeconomic back-
ground, etc.”).
37. Id.; see also McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 243–47 (3d Cir. 2010);
DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2008); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ.,
55 F.3d 1177, 1184 (6th Cir. 1995); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 858–59 (N.D.
Tex. 2004); Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 369 (M.D. Pa. 2003); UWM Post,
Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe
v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
38. Standing is the right of a person to bring suit in court and seek redress, and often
requires proof of injury-in-fact. See Jennifer L. Bruneau, Comment, Injury-in-Fact in Chilling
Effect Challenges to Public University Speech Codes, 64 Cath. U. L. Rev. 975, 979–82 (2015).
39. See id. at 991–95.
40. Majeed, supra note 36, at 484–94.
41. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
42. E.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
43. For example, in the defamation context, the Supreme Court considered the costs of
defending a civil suit in formulating a heavily speech-protective standard, and thus there is no
need for lower courts to loosen ordinary summary judgment standards to protect defendants.
See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279; Schauer, supra note 12, at 710–12.
44. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
45. See Papandrea, supra note 5, at 1849–51.
46. See generally Marie T. Reilly, Due Process in Public University Discipline Cases, 120
Penn St. L. Rev. 1001, 1011–12 (2016) (noting that accused students may be severely limited
in their ability to obtain counsel, cross-examine witnesses, and admit exculpatory evidence).
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universities struggle to provide adequate due process in disciplinary pro-
ceedings.47 When it comes to speech, a single erroneous punishment of pro-
tected speech can have a significant chilling effect.48
Furthermore, stringent judicial review is necessary because many uni-
versities have shown reluctance to comply with judicial decisions regarding
speech codes.49 Although university speech codes are routinely invalidated in
court, schools continue to promulgate policies that infringe on students’
rights.50 Some universities have promulgated highly restrictive speech codes
even in the absence of hateful speech.51 And some universities have not shied
away from enforcing codes that run afoul of the First Amendment.52 In the
face of such stubbornness, courts must take an active role in reviewing uni-
versity speech decisions.
II. Judicial Review of University Action
When universities restrict constitutionally protected speech, judicial re-
view is important to vindicate the rights of university students. Unfortu-
nately, courts differ in their analysis of university regulation of student
speech, leading to confusion for both courts and universities and inconsis-
tent protection for students. This Part identifies three competing modes of
analysis used by lower courts in addressing regulation of offensive student
speech. The three modes of analysis identified here are not mutually exclu-
sive—courts often will blend various styles of analysis,53 adding to the con-
fusion. This confusion creates inconsistency in the courts and leaves
university administrators without clear guidance. Section II.A examines
public forum analysis and argues that it is ill-suited to address offensive
speech on campus. Section II.B examines the use of traditional First Amend-
ment categories to address student speech and concludes that this type of
analysis is insufficient when used in isolation. Section II.C explains the
47. See, e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, Ready, Fire, Aim: How Universities Are Failing the Consti-
tution in Sexual Assault Cases, 48 Ariz. St. L.J. 637, 654–61, 692–96 (2016).
48. See Majeed, supra note 36, at 500.
49. See Jon B. Gould, The Precedent That Wasn’t: College Hate Speech Codes and the Two
Faces of Legal Compliance, 35 Law & Soc’y Rev. 345, 370–71 (2001); Majeed, supra note 36, at
484.
50. See Majeed, supra note 36, at 488–94.
51. See Gould, supra note 49, at 381–82 (describing two schools who implemented new
speech codes in the 1990s, despite admissions by the officials promulgating the policies that
the schools were not experiencing issues with harassment).
52. See, e.g., Coll. Republicans at S.F. State Univ. v. Reed, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1021
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (enjoining continued enforcement of the university speech code’s “civility”
requirement).
53. E.g., Murakowski v. Univ. of Del., 575 F. Supp. 2d 571, 587 (D. Del. 2008) (deploying
all three forms of analysis in an eclectic opinion). Furthermore, some courts consider the
education-specific decisions to be merely a specialized means of forum analysis, such that a
school campus is merely another type of forum with its own level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Slot-
terback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 288–91 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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Third Circuit’s analysis, which adapts the Supreme Court’s education-spe-
cific First Amendment decisions to the university context.
A. Public Forum Analysis
Although public forum analysis is an important First Amendment doc-
trine,54 it has been criticized by many courts and commentators.55 In the
context of regulating student speech, the doctrine has spawned considerable
confusion in the lower courts, not only about whether it should be applied to
educational institutions56 but also about how it should be applied.57
1. The Contours of Public Forum Analysis
Public forum analysis is typically deployed when the government at-
tempts to regulate speech on government property.58 The basic analysis is
straightforward: the court categorizes the public property as a particular
type of forum, classifies the regulation, and then applies the relevant stan-
dard of review.59 The classification of a forum and the type of regulation
determine the level of scrutiny the court applies to the regulations.60 Al-
though courts generally follow these basic steps for public forum analysis,
courts vary in the categories they recognize and the standards they apply.61
54. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677–78 (1998);
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
55. E.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693–94 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a
jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective
of expression into one which grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat. I
believe that the Court’s public forum analysis in these cases is inconsistent with the values
underlying the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment.”); United States v. Kokinda,
497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I have questioned whether public forum
analysis, as the Court has employed it in recent cases, serves to obfuscate rather than clarify the
issues at hand.” (citation omitted)); Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine,
46 Willamette L. Rev. 647, 660–76 (2010); David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum
Doctrine, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 143, 200–03 (1992); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Mis-
leading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication,
70 Va. L. Rev. 1219, 1266 (1984); David A. Thomas, Whither the Public Forum Doctrine: Has
This Creature of the Courts Outlived Its Usefulness?, 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 637 (2010).
56. See, e.g., Slotterback, 766 F. Supp. at 288–91 (declining to apply public forum analysis
in the public school).
57. Compare Armstrong v. James Madison Univ., No. 5:16-cv-00053, 2017 WL 2390234,
at *11 (W.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2017) (finding that speech occurring in nonpublic forum is unpro-
tected) adopted by No. 5:16-cv-53, 2017 WL 2399338 (W.D. Va. June 1, 2017), with Burnham
v. Ianni, 119 F.3d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that speech is not automatically exempt
from First Amendment protection merely because it occurs in a nonpublic forum).
58. Caplan, supra note 55, at 649–52; Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First
Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth Century, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 273, 292 (2009).
59. See, e.g., Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 858–59 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
60. Id.
61. Caplan, supra note 55, at 652–54.
1326 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:1317
The first step of the analysis, identifying the type of forum, has proven
particularly difficult. The Supreme Court has not provided helpful direction
in this area and has even used the same label to describe two very different
categories of forums.62 As a result, courts and commentators are divided
even on the number of existing categories. Some recognize only two,63 others
three,64 and others four.65 Furthermore, courts are inconsistent in their fo-
rum labeling, which can lead other courts to conflate the categories.66 Typi-
cally, regulations on speech in traditional public forums and designated
public forums are subject to strict scrutiny.67 It is difficult to pin down a
precise standard of review for regulations on limited public forums, but at
the very least they must be reasonable.68 Regulations in nonpublic forums
receive a lenient standard of review that only requires they be “reasonable.”69
In the university context, the classification of a location is often quite
difficult. The Supreme Court has noted, “[T]he campus of a public univer-
sity, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics of a public
forum.”70 Yet, the Court went on, “A university differs in significant respects
from public forums . . . . A university’s mission is education, and decisions
of this Court have never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable
regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and
facilities.”71 These statements have led courts to differing conclusions about
the classification of campus property.72
Identifying the type of regulation is also fraught with uncertainty. Regu-
lations are classified based on whether or not they discriminate based on
62. Id. at 654 (noting the Supreme Court’s use of the label “limited public forum” to
describe both locations subject to public forum standards and locations subject to nonpublic
forum standards).
63. E.g., id. (advocating two types of forums: public and nonpublic).
64. E.g., Roberts, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 859 (deploying three types of forums: the traditional
public forum, the designated public forum, and the nonpublic forum).
65. E.g., Amar & Brownstein, supra note 6, at 1945. Amar and Brownstein identify four
types of forums: the traditional public forum, the designated public forum, the limited public
forum, and the nonpublic forum. Id. Elsewhere, Brownstein advocates a fifth category: the
nonforum. Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category: Bringing Order
out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 717, 721–22 (2009).
66. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 6, at 1945; Caplan, supra note 55, at 653–54; see also
Ill. Dunesland Pres. Soc’y v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 584 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2009) (Posner,
J.).
67. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 6, at 1945 (explaining that strict scrutiny is applied
in traditional public forums and designated public forums for viewpoint-discriminatory and
content-discriminatory regulations).
68. Id.
69. Id. (explaining that this lenient standard of review is applied in nonpublic forums to
both content-discriminatory and content-neutral regulations).
70. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981).
71. Id. at 268 n.5.
72. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 6, at 1965 n.96 (detailing the conflicting decisions
reached by various courts).
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content and viewpoint.73 The distinctions are important—often determining
whether a regulation is given strict scrutiny or rational basis review74—but
drawing lines between the categories is difficult,75 and even the Supreme
Court has struggled to articulate a clear way to classify regulations.76 This
fluidity, especially when regulations purport to target only the “secondary
effects” of speech, has led to scholarly fears that determined judges can easily
“eviscerate” First Amendment freedoms.77 In the context of speech that
makes others uncomfortable, it is often difficult to determine whether or not
a prohibition is content or viewpoint neutral, and even some scholars sym-
pathetic to regulation admit that regulations addressing harassing speech are
often content-discriminatory.78
Moving beyond the classification question, courts vary in the leeway
they give to public universities to regulate speech within a given forum. In
O’Brien v. Welty the Ninth Circuit deployed public forum analysis to deter-
mine whether the First Amendment barred a university’s disciplinary ac-
tions against a student.79 The case involved facial and as-applied challenges
to Fresno State’s campus regulations on harassment and intimidation.80 The
student challenging the regulations had been disciplined for videotaping his
confrontations with two professors in their offices while their doors were
open.81 He alleged that he was calm and respectful, though assertive, and the
district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, finding that the profes-
sors could have reasonably felt intimidated by the behavior within the mean-
ing of the university regulations.82 The court rejected the facial claim after a
73. See id. at 1945. A regulation may be content neutral, content-discriminatory and
viewpoint neutral, or viewpoint-discriminatory. Id.
74. Id.
75. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/
Viewpoint Determinations, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 595, 602–08 (2003).
76. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830–31 (1995) (“As
we have noted, discrimination against one set of views or ideas is but a subset or particular
instance of the more general phenomenon of content discrimination. And, it must be ac-
knowledged, the distinction is not a precise one.” (citation omitted)).
77. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: “The Evisceration of First
Amendment Freedoms”, 37 Washburn L.J. 55, 60–61 (1997). The “secondary effects” doctrine
has grown out of the Supreme Court’s decisions upholding regulations on adult theaters. Id. at
61. By claiming to be regulating only the negative effects of speech, rather than its content, a
clever jurist can characterize a regulation as content neutral, even though those effects stem
directly from the content or viewpoint of the speech. See id. at 60–61.
78. Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 1427, 1463–65
(2017) (“We must, I think, abandon the fiction that laws seeking to protect against discomfort
and offense are content-neutral—they are not, since whatever their wording, their clear and
undeniable purpose and effect is to suppress specific messages because of the discomfort or
offense they engender.”).
79. 818 F.3d 920, 930–31 (9th Cir. 2016).
80. O’Brien, 818 F.3d. at 929.
81. Id. at 924–29.
82. Id.
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sparse analysis in which it determined that the terms “harass” and “intimi-
date” were precise enough to defeat an overbreadth or vagueness challenge.83
In assessing the as-applied claim, the court identified the hallway and offices
where the conduct occurred as nonpublic forums.84 Concluding that the
school had acted reasonably and without regard to the student’s viewpoint
in determining that the professors could have felt intimidated by the stu-
dent’s videotaping, the court upheld the disciplinary action as a valid regula-
tion of speech.85 Under this approach to public forum analysis, a great deal
of student speech on campus will occur in limited public or nonpublic fo-
rums and thus be subject to a standard of review that is highly deferential to
regulations.86
The Eighth Circuit has used an analysis that is superficially similar to
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis but uses a more stringent review. In Burnham v.
Ianni, the court considered a student’s challenge to actions taken by the
University of Minnesota–Duluth.87 Two students had collected and posted
pictures on a department bulletin board depicting various faculty members
posing with props representative of their research interests.88 Two professors,
an American studies professor and a classical civilizations professor, posed
with historical weapons—a .45 pistol, and a Roman short sword, respec-
tively.89 When another professor was offended by the display, the university,
after initially resisting the request, ultimately removed the pictures.90 The
students who had posted them sued.91 In assessing the First Amendment
interests, the Eighth Circuit used public forum analysis but found it unnec-
essary to determine whether the forum was a limited public forum or a
nonpublic forum because, even if the board were a nonpublic forum, the
regulation was unreasonable and viewpoint discriminatory.92 Although the
83. Id. at 929–31. The analysis of the facial challenge was minimal—so much so that it is
difficult to identify any mode of analysis in that portion of the opinion.
84. Id. at 931.
85. Id. at 931–32. The court went on to find that the plaintiff’s First Amendment retalia-
tion claim had been prematurely dismissed because the university’s disciplinary action—
though perfectly permissible if based on the plaintiff’s unprotected actions in the hallway—
could have possibly been motivated by separate expressive activity that was protected. Id. at
932–35.
86. See, e.g., Armstrong v. James Madison Univ., No. 5:16-cv-00053, 2017 WL 2390234,
at *9, *11 (W.D. Va. Feb. 23), adopted by No. 5:16-cv-53, 2017 WL 2399338 (W.D. Va. June 1,
2017).
87. 119 F.3d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 1997).
88. Burnham, 119 F.3d at 671.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 671–72.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 675–76, 675 n.12. Because the board had been created to display information
about the history faculty, the court determined that it was unreasonable to suppress that type
of information. Additionally, the decision to remove the pictures of the weapons had discrimi-
nated against the “view that the study of history necessarily involves a study of military his-
tory.” Id. at 676.
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two courts nominally applied the same standard of review, their level of
deference to the schools varied.93
Courts rarely analyze challenges to university harassment codes using
public forum analysis,94 but at least one court has demonstrated what such
an analysis would look like.95 In Roberts v. Haragan, a district court in Texas
deployed forum analysis to evaluate Texas Tech University’s policies restrict-
ing the locations where students may engage in expressive speech and
prohibiting “insults, epithets, ridicule, or personal attacks.”96 The court de-
termined that the campus’s open areas were essentially traditional public
forums, but only for the university’s students.97 When the court turned to
the harassment sections of the code, it noted that the code restricted more
than the traditional unprotected categories of speech.98 Consequently, the
code was unconstitutionally overbroad because such restrictions were im-
permissible in the public forum areas on campus.99 The court’s analysis sug-
gests that a university code that is tailored to operate only in nonpublic
forums would be able to constitutionally restrict a great deal of speech—
particularly in the classroom.100 The Texas district court’s respect for the
rights of universities to restrict speech in the classroom stands in sharp con-
trast with other courts that have declined to apply forum analysis. For exam-
ple, in DeJohn v. Temple University, the Third Circuit did not engage in any
forum analysis in striking down provisions of Temple’s speech code.101 The
court in that case seemed most concerned with the regulation of speech in
the classroom,102 arguably a forum where the university should receive con-
siderable deference.103 Likewise, Doe v. University of Michigan presented an
93. While it is possible that the student disciplined in O’Brien was understating his level
of belligerence in his complaint, the procedural posture of the case required the court to credit
his assurances that he was calm and respectful while videotaping his professors. See O’Brien v.
Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 2016). Thus, the student conduct in both O’Brien and
Burnham was relatively benign, and the difference in outcomes can be attributed to the strin-
gency of the judicial standard of review, rather than factual differences.
94. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. Even some courts that use forum analysis
for challenges to disciplinary action will not apply that analysis to challenges to speech codes.
For example, the Ninth Circuit did not begin its forum analysis in O’Brien until after it had
disposed of the facial challenge to the speech code. Id. at 930.
95. See Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 870–73 (N.D. Tex. 2004).
96. Id. at 870.
97. Id. at 858–64.
98. Id. at 872.
99. Id. at 871–73.
100. Id. at 872.
101. 537 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2008).
102. See id. at 315 (“It is well recognized that ‘[t]he college classroom with its surrounding
environs is peculiarly the “marketplace of ideas [,]” ’ and ‘[t]he First Amendment guarantees
wide freedom in matters of adult public discourse.’ Discussion by adult students in a college
classroom should not be restricted.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first quoting
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); then quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675 (1986))).
103. See Roberts, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 872; Brownstein, supra note 65, at 775–76.
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opportunity to apply forum analysis to a university speech code.104 The
court was particularly disturbed by three instances where students faced dis-
cipline for comments made in the classroom setting, and it strongly sug-
gested that classroom speech enjoyed heightened protection.105 Had these
two courts employed forum analysis, the classroom would most likely have
been designated a nonpublic forum.106 Finally, a district court in North Car-
olina recently used forum analysis in dismissing a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a university’s disciplinary action for allegations of verbal sexual
harassment.107
2. The Virtues and Vices of Public Forum Analysis
Public forum doctrine is particularly useful for determining who has the
right to speak in any given location on a public university campus.108 Uni-
versities regularly reserve certain forums for use by certain groups, and pub-
lic forum doctrine helps courts to analyze those decisions and identify
impermissible speech-related discrimination.109 Setting up specific forums
for certain kinds of speech facilitates debate on campus, and courts should
104. 721 F. Supp. 852, 865–66 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The challenge was brought by a psy-
chology student who had not been sanctioned under the code but feared he might be. Id. at
858. In assessing the code, the court examined the language of the code, the university’s com-
pliance guide, and the enforcement history. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. at 859–61.
105. See id. at 865–66.
106. See, e.g., Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding a
university academic program to be a nonpublic forum where a university restricted speech
that did not comply with professional standards); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277,
1285 (10th Cir. 2004) (“We thus find that the ATP’s classroom constitutes a nonpublic forum,
meaning that school officials could regulate the speech that takes place there ‘in any reasonable
manner.’ ” (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988))).
107. Armstrong v. James Madison Univ., No. 5:16-cv-00053, 2017 WL 2390234, at *12
(W.D. Va. Feb. 23), adopted by No. 5:16-cv-53, 2017 WL 2399338 (W.D. Va. June 1, 2017). An
older man with an alumnus gym membership made unwelcome comments about romantically
pursuing the student working the front desk. Id. at *1. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claim, finding his speech unprotected because the campus gym was
not a traditional or designated public forum, and the restrictions were not based on any con-
troversial views espoused by the plaintiff. Id. at *12.
108. See Stone, supra note 58, at 292–94.
109. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of the Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (“[T]he Court has permitted restrictions on access to a
limited public forum, like the [Registered Student Organization] program here, with this key
caveat: Any access barrier must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral[.]”); Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The necessities of confining a forum
to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserv-
ing it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”); ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438,
442–46 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that a public university’s outdoor areas constitute a limited
public forum, where the speech rights of the campus community and of outside groups can
differ).
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continue to apply public forum analysis to regulations prohibiting certain
speakers from accessing certain forums.110
Furthermore, taking the context of a statement into account in regulat-
ing speech is intuitively sensible, and public forum doctrine attempts to do
just that by focusing heavily on the location where the speech occurs.111
Speech that may be unproblematic in a dormitory could be inflammatory in
a more public area.112 Similarly, in a public area, students may be able to
avoid inflammatory speakers, while in dorms and classrooms they are more
of a “captive audience.”113 But certain contexts involve difficult balances of
rights. For example, it is certainly understandable that students desire to be
free from insults in their residence halls, and yet other students have an
interest in speaking their mind in the place they call home.114 Under public
forum analysis, a dormitory may be considered a nonpublic forum where
the university would receive deferential rational basis review.115 But if, as
commentators have suggested, some universities are poor guardians of free
speech rights, such a deferential standard is troubling.116
Public forum doctrine is ill suited for reviewing university regulation
when the speaker has an unquestioned right to speak. Uncertainty chills
speech, and the application of public forum analysis to college campuses
creates “a patchwork quilt of free speech regimes” that is hardly conducive to
free expression.117 It is difficult for judges, much less students and adminis-
trators, to articulate the temporal and doctrinal lines between the various
types of forums on campus.118 When the degree of permissible regulation
varies based on whether or not students have “crossed some invisible line
between a public and non-public forum,” some students will refrain from
voicing constitutionally protected opinions for fear of being disciplined.119 A
uniform mode of analysis for offensive speech would aid both universities
and students by drawing a consistent line between what is acceptable to cen-
sor and what is not.
Furthermore, forum analysis is completely inadequate for addressing the
unique nature of harassing and offensive speech, which is often most harm-
ful in the aggregate. First, offensive and unwelcome speech is not always
110. For example, a regulation prohibiting non-students from demonstrating in certain
locations around campus. Mote, 423 F.3d at 441–42.
111. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 6, at 1965 n.96.
112. For example, roommates may refer to each other using a particular slur in private
with the mutual understanding that the term is not meant to be derogatory. Such use in a
public place, however, may cause more of a stir.
113. Tsesis, supra note 4, at 1902–03.
114. Papandrea, supra note 5, at 1825.
115. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 6, at 1963–68.
116. See Papandrea, supra note 5, at 1857.
117. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 6, at 1967; see also supra Part I (discussing the ambi-
guity of campus speech codes and the uncertainties involved in their enforcement).
118. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 6, at 1967.
119. Id. (quoting Brister v. Faulkner, 214 F.3d 675, 682 (5th Cir. 2000)).
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isolated but rather may be scattered across many locations.120 If each loca-
tion requires a separate analysis to determine whether the speech was pro-
tected, any judicial review of disciplinary action would be overwhelmingly
complex and thus ineffective. Second, harassment is increasingly taking
place through electronic communication. How should text messages be-
tween students on campus be treated? Does the situation change if one stu-
dent is on campus and the other is not? Plainly, courts will need to adopt
another mode of analysis for dealing with purely online speech, but what
approach is appropriate in situations involving a mixture of in-person and
online speech? The wisdom of regulating student’s online speech is fiercely
debated,121 and the legality of such a pursuit is unsettled.122 Still, schools
have taken an active role in battling student-on-student harassment in
cyberspace, and courts must be able to coherently analyze school regulation
of student speech.123 A single mode of analysis that could address the cumu-
lative effects of both in-person and online speech would simplify the inquiry
for courts and provide clarity for schools contemplating disciplinary action.
Forum analysis is unable to provide such a unified mode of analysis.124
B. Traditional First Amendment Categories
The categorical approach to First Amendment analysis was articulated
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or “fight-
ing” words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.125
120. Take, for example, the case of an unwelcome suitor—the offending remarks may
come over a period of weeks and occur in dorms, classrooms, cafeterias, and social areas.
121. See generally Michael K. Park, Restricting Anonymous “Yik Yak”: The Constitutionality
of Regulating Students’ Off-Campus Online Speech in the Age of Social Media, 52 Willamette
L. Rev. 405, 425–38 (2016) (reviewing Tinker and other Supreme Court cases that “refined the
scope of student speech,” exploring the applicability of Tinker to university campuses, and
analyzing how appellate courts have addressed off-campus online speech).
122. See, e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013)
(agreeing with the Third Circuit’s view that the “scope of Tinker’s ‘interference with the rights
of others’ language is unclear” but declining to elaborate on when speech stops being merely
offensive and starts interfering with others’ rights); Yeasin v. Durham, 224 F. Supp. 3d 1194,
1203 (D. Kan. 2016) (“[C]ircuit courts have come to conflicting conclusions on whether a
school can regulate off-campus, online student speech where such speech could foreseeably
cause a material disruption to the administration of the school.”).
123. E.g., Koeppel v. Romano, 252 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1323–24 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (uphold-
ing the expulsion of a student for sending intimidating, hostile, offensive, and threatening text
messages to a classmate while both were off-campus).
124. This is not to say that forum analysis does not have a role to play on campus, only
that it should be restricted to questions of access.
125. 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (footnotes omitted).
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The existence of such categories prevents judges from labeling an idea as
“low value” merely because it is unpopular.126 In practice, courts do not
typically take the stirring language of Chaplinsky at face value—not all
speech that falls into the five listed categories is unprotected,127 nor does the
fact that speech causes injury “by [its] very utterance”128 make it unpro-
tected.129 Still, this oft-quoted opinion has served as the basis for a great deal
of First Amendment jurisprudence.130
1. The Contours of Pure Categorical Analysis
The exact steps in a categorical analysis vary depending on whether the
court is hearing a challenge to a disciplinary action,131 a challenge to a
speech code,132 or both.133 In assessing these challenges, courts operate with
the baseline assumption that universities, as state actors, cannot prohibit
speech unless it falls into one of the well-defined categories of unprotected
speech.134 In challenges to disciplinary actions, the focus of the analysis is on
the speech itself, as opposed to the forum where the speech occurs.135 If the
speech at issue does not fall within the categories of unprotected speech, the
court generally must determine whether or not the speech was “a substantial
or motivating factor” for the punitive action.136 In challenges to speech
codes, the courts analyze the code using a standard First Amendment over-
breadth analysis and determine whether or not the code is limited to prohib-
iting only unprotected speech.137 In both postures, the key to the court’s
inquiry is its interpretation of the traditional First Amendment categories of
unprotected speech. While some commentators have attempted to classify
harassment as its own category of unprotected speech,138 most have at-
tempted to fit harassing and offensive speech into commonly accepted cate-
gories or to analogize it to narrow First Amendment doctrines that are not
126. Stone, supra note 58, at 284.
127. Wayne Batchis, On the Categorical Approach to Free Speech—And the Protracted Fail-
ure to Delimit the True Threats Exception to the First Amendment, 37 Pace L. Rev. 1, 13–14
(2016).
128. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
129. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011).
130. See Batchis, supra note 127, at 11–17.
131. E.g., Johnson v. W. State Colo. Univ., 71 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1228–31 (D. Colo. 2014).
132. E.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
133. E.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1180–81 (6th Cir. 1995).
134. See Johnson, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1228.
135. Id.
136. Retzlaff v. de la Viña, 606 F. Supp. 2d 654, 657 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
137. UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of the Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1172
(E.D. Wis. 1991).
138. E.g., Tsesis, supra note 4, at 1899. But see Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d
200, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.) (“In short, we see little basis for the District Court’s
sweeping assertion that ‘harassment’—at least when it consists of speech targeted solely on the
basis of its expressive content—‘has never been considered to be protected activity under the
1334 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:1317
truly categories.139 Three categories of unprotected speech are most plausibly
relevant in dealing with genuinely harassing speech: fighting words, true
threats, and incitement.
Perhaps the most common category for evaluating offensive and harass-
ing speech is the longstanding “fighting words” doctrine.140 In a recent case
arising in Florida, a district court held that pervasive, sexually explicit text
messages from one student to another constituted fighting words, which the
school could constitutionally punish.141 A closely related class of speech is
the “true threat.” This category of speech encompasses those statements
“where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent
to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”142 This category of speech includes intimidation, and the doc-
trine protects individuals from “the fear of violence,” as well as “the possi-
bility that the threatened violence will occur.”143 Such a category is well
suited to address one of the most pressing harms from harassing speech: the
exclusion of certain groups for fear of violence. Indeed, a great deal of
speech that is intimidating enough to deny equal access to resources and
opportunities would fit in the category of true threats.144 The doctrine allows
universities to fight egregious speech on campus while respecting First
Amendment rights.145 Finally, speech may be restricted if it is “directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action.”146 This is a narrow category, and most offensive speech
First Amendment.’ Such a categorical rule is without precedent in the decisions of the Su-
preme Court or this Court, and it belies the very real tension between anti-harassment laws
and the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of speech.”).
139. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 5, at 1823–27 (refuting attempts to justify regulation
of offensive speech on the basis of “captive audience” and “secondary effects” doctrines).
140. Some scholars question the vitality of the doctrine after Snyder. E.g., Papandrea,
supra note 5, at 1819 (doubting the survival the fighting words doctrine and noting the con-
siderable disagreement on the exact contours of “fighting words”). Others insist it remains
persuasive in the realm of harassment. See, e.g., Tsesis, supra note 4, at 1895–96 (“There can be
little doubt that a campus speech code with a fighting words provision would survive constitu-
tional challenge.”).
141. Koeppel v. Romano, 252 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (“The Court finds
that Koeppel’s speech in this case is exactly the kind of speech described by the Supreme Court
in Chaplinky [sic]. It was texted to Jane in order to intimidate her and contained words ‘of
such slight social value . . . that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ ” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)).
142. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
143. Id. at 360.
144. See Majeed, supra note 36, at 516.
145. See, e.g., Osei v. Temple Univ. of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., No.
10–2042, 2011 WL 4549609, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2011) (rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to a university’s disciplinary actions against a student who sent threatening emails to
a professor), aff’d, 518 F. App’x 86 (3d Cir. 2013).
146. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
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will not amount to incitement, but it permits schools to censor calls to com-
mit violence against disfavored groups.147
2. Courts Relying Solely on Categorical Analysis
Traditional categorical analysis at least implicitly plays a role in every
analysis of harassing or offensive speech. It is virtually undisputed that
schools can lawfully proscribe speech falling into one of the unprotected
categories.148 A few courts have ended their analysis after determining that
the regulated speech did not fit into one of these categories, invalidating the
code at issue.149 Other courts proceed in the analysis to determine whether
or not the school can put forward some other justification for the regula-
tion, either through public forum analysis,150 or an education-specific analy-
sis.151 This Section identifies the courts that have not elected to supplement
the categorical analysis, but rather have invalidated school regulations after
determining that they reach speech that does not fall in an unprotected cate-
gory. Johnson v. Western State Colorado University is the only recent example
of a court ending its inquiry into a school’s disciplinary action after the
categorical analysis in a case dealing with disciplinary action for harassing
speech.152 Johnson, a student at Western, sent a sexually explicit letter to his
then-girlfriend describing sadomasochistic acts and expressing a desire to
perform them on her.153 One month later, they ended their relationship and
the girl’s mother handed over the letter to school officials, who used it in
disciplinary proceedings against the student for “inappropriate behavior to-
wards another student.”154 In considering the school’s motion to dismiss the
First Amendment claims, the court determined that the letter did not consti-
tute a true threat, and therefore Johnson had sufficiently demonstrated that
147. Papandrea, supra note 5, at 1820.
148. With one important caveat—R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul suggests that regulation of even
unprotected speech must be viewpoint neutral to pass constitutional scrutiny. 505 U.S. 377,
393–94 (1992). This is important for universities to consider when drafting speech codes,
because many define harassment as behavior targeting certain protected classes, and courts
have determined that such qualifications are viewpoint-discriminatory. See Dambrot v. Cent.
Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1184 (6th Cir. 1995).
149. E.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163,
1171–74 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
150. See supra Section II.A.
151. See infra Section II.C.
152. 71 F. Supp. 3d 1217, 1228–29 (D. Colo. 2014). In 1993, the Fourth Circuit used a
similar (though brief) analysis to enjoin a school’s sanctions against a fraternity that sponsored
a racially insensitive “ugly woman contest.” Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George
Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 1993). The university argued for the application of
Tinker, but the court rejected that argument without substantial analysis. Id. at 393.
153. Johnson, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1221–22. According to the student, such communication
and conduct was a regular and mutually agreed-upon component of their relationship. Id.
154. Id. at 1222–23.
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his speech was protected.155 The court did not inquire into alternative justifi-
cations for the school’s decision.156
More common is the use of categorical analysis as the sole form of in-
quiry in challenges to university speech codes.157 It is worth noting that in
some cases, categorical analysis is accompanied by an inquiry into whether
the restriction is viewpoint neutral, without conducting a forum analysis.
The Sixth Circuit used this approach in Dambrot v. Central Michigan Univer-
sity to invalidate CMU’s harassment policy.158 After comparing the policy to
the category of fighting words and finding the restrictions overly broad, the
court declared that the policy would be invalid even if it were limited to
fighting words.159 Relying on R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,160 the court declared
that the policy constituted viewpoint discrimination because it specifically
targeted racial harassment.161
3. The Virtues and Vices of Pure Categorical Analysis
The deployment of traditional First Amendment categories is so firmly
entrenched that courts find it difficult to avoid engaging in at least some
form of categorical analysis.162 Still, even commentators who believe tradi-
tional categories are sufficient to protect students from truly harmful speech
agree that at least some further analysis is necessary.163 Additionally, the cat-
egories of unprotected speech do not provide clear guidance to university
officials. Traditional First Amendment categories of unprotected speech have
been primarily enforced by courts;164 however, as noted in Part I, the major-
ity of enforcement comes at the university level through speech codes and
155. See id. at 1229 (“[A] reasonable juror could conclude that the contents of the Dear
Onna Letter did not constitute a ‘true threat’ and were, therefore, protected speech.”).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. Of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp.
1163, 1169–71 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 862–63 (E.D. Mich.
1989).
158. 55 F.3d 1177, 1184 (6th Cir. 1995).
159. Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1184.
160. 505 U.S. 377, 393–94 (1992).
161. Dambrot, 55 F.3d at 1184.
162. See Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court and Categorical
First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1339, 1345 (2015) (observing
that while the Roberts Court does not appear eager to add new categories of unprotected
speech, the Court’s recent First Amendment jurisprudence indicates that existing categories
will remain central to First Amendment analysis).
163. See, e.g., Majeed, supra note 36, at 516 (advocating a “true harassment” approach
that would prohibit speech that creates a hostile environment under various civil rights stat-
utes, even if the speech does not fit in a traditional category).
164. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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university disciplinary measures. Courts deploying the fighting words doc-
trine have promulgated confusing interpretations and have deployed the dic-
tum in Chaplisky inconsistently.165 While the categorical approach will
(rightly) continue to play an important role in judicial review, supplement-
ing it with an education-specific analysis would clarify the law for adminis-
trators and increase the coherence and predictability of judicial review.
C. Education-Specific Analysis
The Supreme Court’s education-specific jurisprudence began with the
Tinker decision, which addressed the regulation of student speech in middle
and high schools.166 Because the speech at issue was clearly pure political
expression, the Court’s analysis did not rely on categories.167 Tinker fa-
mously declared that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” and limited the
ability of schools to suppress speech to that “which might reasonably [lead]
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interfer-
ence with school activities.”168 Nearly two decades later, the Court issued
two further decisions in the high school context: Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser169 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.170 Fraser’s analy-
sis resembled a modified categorical approach that was more speech-restric-
tive in the school context, and the Court upheld the school’s sanctions for
lewd and indecent speech.171 Hazelwood applied forum analysis to speech in
a school newspaper and concluded that the paper was not a public forum,
but rather a school-sponsored activity.172 In such “school-sponsored expres-
sive activities,” schools may generally restrict student speech “so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”173
The application of these opinions to the university context raises many ques-
tions, and courts have differed on whether and how to apply the Supreme
Court’s education-specific analysis.174
165. See Batchis, supra note 127, at 12–22 (identifying the varying interpretations of
Chaplinsky and arguing that the most widely used interpretation—the “low-value speech” ap-
proach—allows judges to inject their own value judgments into the analysis, compounding the
confusion and inconsistency).
166. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504–05 (1969).
167. Id. at 505. Additionally, the decision came before the emergence of modern public
forum doctrine, and the opinion bears little resemblance to that style of analysis. See Day,
supra note 55, at 160–62.
168. 393 U.S. at 506, 514.
169. 478 U.S. 675, 675 (1986).
170. 484 U.S. 260, 260 (1988).
171. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
172. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 269–70.
173. Id. at 273.
174. The Roberts Court ventured into the student speech context in Morse v. Frederick.
551 U.S. 393, 403–06 (2007). The opinion unhelpfully fails to adopt a clear form of analysis,
and the case appears to stand only for the proposition that schools may restrict “student
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1. The Contours of Education-Specific Analysis
Drawing a coherent analysis from Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood is no
simple task, and, unsurprisingly, courts have differed in how they apply the
doctrine in the university setting. The Third Circuit has the most developed
doctrine in the harassment context, and this Section will set out the test as
applied in that circuit’s jurisprudence.
The first major opinion in this line of analysis—Saxe v. State College
Area School District—came in the context of a challenge to a public school
district’s speech code banning “harassment.”175 In an opinion by then-Judge
Alito, the Third Circuit invalidated the policy as overbroad.176 After rejecting
the lower court’s assertion that “harassment” is a category of unprotected
speech,177 then-Judge Alito synthesized the Supreme Court’s education cases:
Under Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit lewd, vulgar or profane
language. Under Hazelwood, a school may regulate school-sponsored
speech (that is, speech that a reasonable observer would view as the
school’s own speech) on the basis of any legitimate pedagogical concern.
Speech falling outside of these categories is subject to Tinker’s general rule:
it may be regulated only if it would substantially disrupt school operations
or interfere with the right of others.178
The school’s policy swept too broadly because it reached speech that was
merely offensive, and it was not limited to speech that actually interfered
with other students’ rights.179
The Third Circuit considered the university context in DeJohn v. Temple
University, where a graduate student challenged the university’s policy
prohibiting
all forms of sexual harassment . . . including . . . expressive, visual, or
physical conduct of a sexual or gender-motivated nature, when . . . (c) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an indi-
vidual’s work, educational performance, or status; or (d) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment.180
The court used the analysis articulated in Saxe but acknowledged that a uni-
versity has “less leeway” to restrict speech than a primary or secondary
speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”
Id. at 403.
175. 240 F.3d 200, 202–04 (3d Cir. 2001).
176. Id. at 217.
177. Id. at 211.
178. Id. at 214.
179. Id. at 216–17. Shortly after the Saxe decision, a district court applied the analysis in
the university context. In Bair v. Shippensburg University, the court noted that the ability of
universities to censor student speech is more limited than that of primary and secondary
schools, but did not opine on the extent of the difference because Shippensburg’s code failed
even the more lenient test. 280 F. Supp. 2d 357, 369 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
180. 537 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original).
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school.181 For example, Fraser’s carve out for lewd and indecent speech in
high schools seems to be completely inapplicable in the university context
because college students are generally adults.182 The court found that Tem-
ple’s policy was overbroad because it could cover political and religious
speech that someone finds offensive.183 Without “a showing of severity or
pervasiveness,” the code could chill protected speech, even if it were limited
to speech that creates a hostile environment.184 The court hinted that a pol-
icy with such narrow requirements might pass strict scrutiny review but re-
frained from commenting further.185 In McCauley v. University of the Virgin
Islands, the Third Circuit used the DeJohn analysis and defended at length
the enhanced speech protections for university students, when compared
with high school students.186 Despite noting the stronger protections, the
court declined to articulate an exact standard:
Public universities have significantly less leeway in regulating student
speech than public elementary or high schools. . . . At a minimum, the
teachings of Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, Morse, and other decisions involv-
ing speech in public elementary and high schools, cannot be taken as gos-
pel in cases involving public universities. Any application of free speech
doctrine derived from these decisions to the university setting should be
scrutinized carefully, with an emphasis on the underlying reasoning of the
rule to be applied.187
To summarize the Third Circuit’s analysis, when student speech may
reasonably be mistaken for the university’s speech,188 the school has a
heightened ability to regulate.189 In other circumstances, a university may
only restrict student speech when it is “sever[e] or pervasive[ ];” that is to
say, it must “objectively and subjectively create[ ] a hostile environment or
181. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 316.
182. See id. at 315.
183. Id. at 317–18.
184. Id. at 318–20 (citing Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999)).
185. Id. at 319–20 (“[W]e do believe that a school has a compelling interest in preventing
harassment. Yet, unless harassment is qualified with a standard akin to a severe or pervasive
requirement, a harassment policy may suppress core protected speech.”).
186. 618 F.3d 232, 243–47 (3d Cir. 2010).
187. Id. at 247.
188. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2001). Other courts
have adopted a similar interpretation of Hazelwood. See, e.g., Corlett v. Oakland Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 958 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (“Hazelwood applies only where the speech in
question reasonably could be construed as representing the school’s own viewpoint.”); Amar
& Brownstein, supra note 6, at 1950–51 (outlining the argument that Hazelwood is analogous
to government speech doctrine rather than public forum doctrine).
189. The Third Circuit has not had occasion to clarify how the Hazelwood standard ap-
plies to school-sponsored speech in the university setting. For thorough discussions of Hazel-
wood in the university setting, see Amar & Brownstein, supra note 6, at 1946–63, and
Papandrea, supra note 5, at 1843–48.
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substantially interfere[ ] with an individual’s work.”190 The court has not yet
explained what a speech policy that meets this standard would look like.
2. Courts Adopting an Education-Specific Analysis in the
University Context
The Third Circuit’s university-specific approach has gained some trac-
tion. A district court in Virginia recently adopted the Third Circuit’s test in a
case involving disciplinary measures taken against a student by George Ma-
son University.191 Similarly, a district court in Florida used the DeJohn analy-
sis in rejecting a challenge to a university harassment code.192 The code at
issue included the “severe and pervasive” language suggested in DeJohn, and
the court found it sufficiently speech protective.193 A district court in Ohio
applied the DeJohn analysis to a challenge to both a university speech code
and a disciplinary action against a student based on that code.194 Other
courts have not adopted the Third Circuit’s approach to modifying Tinker
for higher education but have used Hazelwood in the university context.195
The Hazelwood rule has caused confusion and controversy in the university
context,196 but the willingness of courts to adapt the secondary school deci-
sion to the university context may indicate an increased willingness to adapt
the Tinker standard as well.
III. A Better Way Forward
The education-specific approach used in the Third Circuit, while not
perfect, protects the First Amendment rights of students while allowing uni-
versity administrators to take action against the speech that most severely
affects targeted students. This Part evaluates the benefits and shortcomings
of the Third Circuit’s approach and proposes a clearer version of the DeJohn
test to address some shortcomings.
190. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 317–18.
191. Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602, 625–27 (E.D.
Va. 2016).
192. Koeppel v. Romano, 252 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1325–26 (M.D. Fla. 2017).
193. Id.
194. Marshall v. Ohio Univ., No. 2:15–cv–775, 2015 WL 1179955, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
13, 2015).
195. Although the Ninth Circuit uses forum analysis in addressing harassing speech, it has
used Hazelwood in addressing speech in the curricular context. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 949
(9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he parties have not identified, nor have we found, any Supreme Court
case discussing the appropriate standard for reviewing a university’s regulation of students’
curricular speech. It is thus an open question whether Hazelwood articulates the standard for
reviewing a university’s assessment of a student’s academic work. We conclude that it does.”).
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit used Hazelwood and Tinker to address university action against a
student because of her religious speech in the curricular setting. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727,
734 (6th Cir. 2012).
196. See Papandrea, supra note 5, at 1843–48.
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First, the approach reflects well-established First Amendment principles
that overprotect some speech of minimal value to provide sufficient “breath-
ing space” to allow valuable speech to flourish.197 As the DeJohn court admit-
ted, the severe and pervasive standard will prevent universities from
suppressing some speech that genuinely creates a harmful environment for
some students.198 This mirrors other areas of free speech doctrine that reflect
speech’s priority. For example, the standard for incitement explained in
Brandenburg prohibits only speech that is “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”199
The Brandenburg standard reflects a fear that the difficulty in trying to dis-
tinguish passionate advocacy from incitement will lead to the erroneous
punishment of legitimate advocacy.200 Likewise, in the DeJohn test, the Third
Circuit is concerned that universities will suppress legitimate moral and po-
litical speech because it is offensive.201
As noted in Part I, this overprotection of speech may underprotect
marginalized students. Students are likely to abuse their right to speak freely,
and the burden of this hurtful speech is likely to fall disproportionately on
underrepresented groups.202 Yet increased university regulation is unlikely to
eliminate this problem. Speech restrictions are often enforced against the
very groups they were meant to protect.203 Additionally, censorship “makes
heroes out of bigots.”204 When schools concentrate on solidarity and recon-
ciliation instead of retribution, the campus climate improves as students and
administrators mobilize against hate.205
There are some practical challenges to the standard articulated by the
Third Circuit. While the Third Circuit’s approach provides more guidance
to students and administrators than either of the other standards, it is hardly
a model of clarity. Still, unlike courts deploying public forum doctrine, with
its patchwork quilt of forums and standards, courts in the Third Circuit
need only sort out two standards—one for speech bearing “the imprimatur
197. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963).
198. DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 320 (3d Cir. 2008). Additionally, the court
expressed doubts that schools would be justified suppressing speech merely because it unrea-
sonably interferes with the work of other students. Id. at 319 (“If we were to construe ‘unrea-
sonable’ as encompassing a subjective and objective component, it still does not necessarily
follow that speech which effects an unreasonable interference with an individual’s work justi-
fies restricting another’s First Amendment freedoms.”).
199. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
200. Schauer, supra note 12, at 724–25.
201. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 320. For example, the plaintiff in DeJohn was a graduate student
who sued, claiming that under the school’s harassment code, he could face disciplinary action
for expressing controversial opinions regarding the role of women in the military. Id. at 305.
202. See Matsuda, supra note 16, at 2331–35.
203. Strossen, supra note 13, at 556–59 (noting historical instances where the antiracism
laws were enforced against the minorities they were intended to protect).
204. Id. at 559 (quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431, 438).
205. See id. at 560.
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of the school,” and one for all other speech.206 The line between school-
sponsored speech and nonsponsored speech is complex,207 but it does not
pose the same impossibilities public forum doctrine does in dealing with
aggregate and online speech.208
A significant problem with the Third Circuit’s standard is that it is
largely consequentialist—that is, the protected status of speech depends sig-
nificantly on how it is received. First, in some situations, the consequences
of speech will be difficult for a speaker to know ex ante, which might dis-
courage speakers from saying things that are valuable for fear they will be
received poorly. Secondly, consequentialist speech standards often produce
viewpoint discriminatory regulation.209 For example, by assuming that cer-
tain inflammatory speakers would have detrimental effects on some groups,
administrators can censor viewpoints they consider inflammatory, while
permitting others they view as benign.210 By relying primarily on the conse-
quences of speech, the Third Circuit’s approach opens the door to uneven
enforcement. In order to alleviate this risk, courts adopting (and adapting)
the Third Circuit’s approach should require universities to narrowly tailor
speech regulation to target only exclusionary speech targeting a particular
student211 and to insulate “core protected speech.”212 The DeJohn court does
not define “core protected speech,”213 but presumably it had in mind the
definition articulated in Saxe: “moral and political discourse—the lifeblood
of constitutional self government (and democratic education) and the core
concern of the First Amendment.”214 Thus, in order to punish a student for
206. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)); see also DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 317
n.17.
207. See Papandrea, supra note 5, at 1843–48.
208. See supra Section II.A.2.
209. I am indebted to Professor Krotoszynski for this observation, which he shared at an
author workshop. Workshop with Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., John S. Stone Chairholder of
Law & Dir. of Faculty Research, Univ. of Ala. Sch. of Law, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Sept. 21,
2017) (discussing Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Disappearing First Amendment: On
the Decline of Freedom of Speech and the Growing Problem of Inequality Among
Speakers (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 33–36) (on file with the Michigan Law Review)
[hereinafter Krotoszynski, The Disappearing First Amendment]).
210. Professor Krotosyzynski uses the example of a university administrator who invites
Peter Singer to advocate the killing of newborns with birth defects but prohibits Milo Yianno-
poulos from speaking because the latter is more likely to produce student unrest. Krotoszyn-
ski, The Disappearing First Amendment (manuscript at 35).
211. That is, speech that “objectively and subjectively creates a hostile environment” or
substantially hinders a student’s access to educational opportunities. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 318.
Speech that targets one particular student is less likely to be core protective speech and is more
likely to be exclusionary than speech directed to a broad audience. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Com-
ment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1791, 1843–72 (1992)
(arguing that workplace harassment law should distinguish between one-to-one speech and
one-to-many speech and ought to provide less protection to the former category).
212. DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 318.
213. Id.
214. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).
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speech, the school would need to show that the speech created a hostile
environment or substantially deprived the victims of access to opportunities,
and that it was not an expression of a moral or political opinion.215 This
standard, while still somewhat consequentialist, would put the burden on
universities to ensure that they are not regulating speech merely because
they disagree with it or because it has caused a disruptive reaction.
This approach also leaves open various methods for universities to pro-
tect students from harassment. For example, no contact orders can be nar-
rowly tailored to pass constitutional muster.216 By proscribing contact with
an individual as opposed to the expression of certain ideas, these orders can
avoid suppressing core speech while insulating targeted students from po-
tential tormentors.217 Such an order is likely to satisfy the proposed narrow
tailoring requirement and will prevent individual students from facing har-
assment. Additionally, universities remain free to condemn even protected
speech and to reaffirm that a campus is inclusive and welcoming. Tolerating
hateful or offensive speech does not require a school to ratify it or stay silent.
Although it may be wise to remain silent in some circumstances to avoid
giving unnecessary publicity to isolated acts of hatred, administrators re-
main free to speak out against hateful ideas and to encourage solidarity with
targeted groups. Finally, universities are able to regulate speech that falls into
the traditional categories of unprotected speech, as well as speech that is
exclusionary and does not express core moral or political beliefs.
Conclusion
Speech transforms culture—censorship only temporarily hides the rot
and prevents effective engagement. By analyzing university regulation of of-
fensive student speech under the DeJohn standard, judges, administrators,
and students can have a reasonably clear idea of what the Constitution re-
quires and when offensive speech becomes harassment. This clarity pro-
motes speech and encourages opinions that challenge the status quo. By
utilizing reasonable and constitutionally permissible tools, such as counter-
speech, narrowly drafted harassment codes, and no-contact orders, schools
can provide inclusive and welcoming environments. Each instance of hateful
speech provides an opportunity to condemn hate and extol the virtues of
tolerance, even if it means tolerating ideas that are hateful.
215. Again, this standard will allow some odious and hurtful language to go unpunished
in the name of the transcendent value of speech. See supra Part I.
216. See generally Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 Has-
tings L.J. 781, 826–43 (2013) (proposing ways to avoid First Amendment violations in civil
harassment orders).
217. Id. at 842 (explaining that a carefully crafted no-contact order can protect a student’s
safety and privacy without infringing on the speaker’s right to communicate with others).
